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COMMENTS AND NOTES
COPYRIGHT FAIR USE-CASE LAW AND
LEGISLATION
Fair use is a judicially Jbrmulated concept which allows persons
other than the copyright owner to use copyrighted material
without permission. The present comment sets forth the rather
unsettled case law definition of fair use, and recommends an
analy'ser for delineating the relationship between fair use and an
equally amorphous copyright concept, substantial similarity.
This delineation is then assessed in light of the codification of
lair use proposed in- the copyright legislation now pending before
Congress.
Technological advances in the fields of photocopying and
information storage and retrieval, combined with the proliferation
of educational and cable television, have stimulated a thorough
congressional review of copyright legislation.' In addition to
specific provisions covering information storage2 and developments
in television, 3 resulting legislation proposals contain a general
provision codifying the previously nonstatutory concept of "fair
use."4 Under that concept, persons other than the owner may use
copyrighted material, despite the fact that a literal reading of the
copyright statute would permit use of the material only by the
copyright holder.' Since the judicial formulation of fair use is at
' 113 CONG. REC. 3629 (daily ed. April 6, 1967) (remarks of Representative Rhodes); H.R.
Rtp. No. 83, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 83].
'Copyright Bill 108, H.R. 2512, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter referred to as
Copyright Bill]. Also printed at 113 CONG. REC. ,3631 (daily ed. April 6, 1967); H.R. REP.
No. 83. In the 90th Congress the House passed an amended version of H.R. 2512 on March
II, 1967. CCH 1967-68 CONGRESSIONAL INDEX at 5563. The Senate, however, never acted on
the companion bill, S. 597, see id. at 3546, but did hold hearings. Hearings on S. 597 Before the
Subconim. on Patents. Trademarks, and Copyrights oJ the Senate Contin. on the Judiciary.
90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967).
'Copyright Bill §§ 110-11.
' Copyright Bill § 107. For the text of the bill, see text accompanying note 192 infra.
Sections 108-116 contain qualifications on the exclusive rights granted in § 106. Specific
provisions not mentioned in the text deal with ephemeral recordings: pictorial, graphic and
spulptural works; and problems of the phonograph record industry.
'See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
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best a nebulous concept, the recommended codification could
significantly affect developing case law, with any construction or
expansion of the doctrine having broad ramifications for the
publishing industry. The purpose of this comment is to delineate
more clearly the scope of fair use by analyzing its essential factors
and their present interrelationship under the impact of the current
bill.
DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
The proposed copyright legislation is the most recent
development in the expansion of protection for the interest of
authors in their works, the statutory inception of which was the
copyright act of 8 Anne in 1709.6 That act granted authors of
books certain exclusive rights in their works for a limited time
period. However, early attemfpts were made to claim even broader
protection than that afforded by the statute. Thus, in the decade
prior to the American Revolution, publishers attempted to avoid
the time limitations of 8 Anne by asserting a perpetual copyright at
common law.7 Indeed, in Millar v. Taylor, it was held, with the
concurrence of Lord Mansfield, that a perpetual copyright did exist
at common law. Later, however, in *Donaldson v. Beckett,' the
House of Lords ruled that although an owner possessed perpetual
literary property in unpublished works, any similar common law
right as to published works had been displaced by 8 Anne.
Moreover, in practice this statutory protection was further limited
by permitting some copying as long as there was a judicial Finding
of "fair dealing." 0 The fair dealing concept, codified by Parliament
in 1911,11 apparently represented an attempt to reconcile what the
6 Copyright Act of 1709, 8 Anne c. 19. Prior to 8 Anne, the laws granting exclusive rights
in literary property had taken the form of exclusive licenses granted to the stationer's
company by the crown as a method of controlling the dissemination of printed matter. See
generally H. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY §§ 2-3 (1944); W.
COPINGER & S. JAMES, COPYRIGHT §§ 21-30 (10th ed. 1965); A. WEIL. AMERICAN
COPYRIGHT LAW §§ 8-9 (1917).
'See H. BALL, note 6 supra at § 3.
'98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1869).
1 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (1774).
"
0See Saunders v. Smith, 40 Eng. Rep. 1100 (1838); Bramwell v. Halcomb, 40 Eng. Rep.
1110 (1836); Wilkins v. Aikin, 34 Eng. Rep. 163 (1810); W. COPINGER. supra note 6.
at § 460.
" Copyright Act of 1911, § 2(l)(i), I & 2 Geo. 5 c. 46.
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courts recognized as the dual purposes of 8 Anne: to reward the
author, and to stimulate other authors to produce for the benefit
of society."2
The historical development of American copyright law closely
parallels the English experience. While the first English copyright
act could have become part of state common law under various
reception statutes and constitutional provisions,'3 resort to such
statutes was never necessitated since, pursuant to a
recommendation of the Continental Congress," many states
adopted express statutory provisions patterned on 8 Anne."
Drawing on the English and state experience, the framers of the
Constitution subsequently established the basis for uniform national
copyright legislation by expressly providing for power in the
national government to secure to authors exclusive rights in their
writings. Thus, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides:
"The Congress shall have Power .. .to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."'" The first Congress implemented this grant with
legislation similar in form to its English and state law
antecedents. 7 State laws were not entirely preempted, however, for
the Supreme Court, analogizing to Donaldson v. Beckett, construed
the federal legislation as the exclusive source of copyright in
published works, thereby leaving protection of the property in
"See Cary v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679 (1802); Yankwich, What is Fair Use? 22 U.
CHI. L. REv. 203, 204 (1954).
"See. e.g.. CONST. OF MD., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS ACT, art. 5 (1957) (received as of
July 4. 1776); CONST. oF N.Y., art. I, § 14 (1954) (1775); PA. STAT. A.."N. tit. 46, § 152
(1952) (Feb. 10, 1777).
"The Continental Congress by resolution recommended such legislation. 8 JOURNALS OF
CONGRESS: CONTAINING THEIR PROCEEDINGS FROM Nov. 2, 1782 TO Nov. 1, 1783 at 256-57
(1800).
' For a collection of these early state statutes, see COPYRiGHT ENACTMENTS. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE BULLETIN No. 3, at 1-21 (1963). Only Delaware failed to enact such a statute. Id. at
21.
" U.S. CONST. art. 1. § 8. For a thorough review of-the interpretations of the
constitutional language, see M. NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §§ 1-9 (1966).
" Compare Copyright Act, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 with authorities cited in note 15
supra. The first federal statute broadened the scope of the "writings" protected by 8 Anne.
Thus, the U.S. enactment included maps, charts and prints, a listing that has been used as
the basis of a liberal construction of the constitutional term "writings." See Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, Ill U.S. 53 (1884).
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unpublished works to the states.'8 Reliance on other English
precedents also led lower federal courts to develop the concept of
"fair use,"' 9 the American counterpart of England's "fair dealing."
INFRINGEMENT-JUDICIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STATUTORY
PATTERN
The basic pattern of the United States' copyright law has
remained unchanged since the original act in 1790.2" Thus, the
federal statutes have continuously authorized the granting of
copyrights which confer certain exclusive rights. For instance,
section l(a) presently protects the exclusive right of the copyright
holder to print, reprint, publish, copy, vend, and make a translation
or other version. 2' If the enumerated rights are infringed, section
101 provides for injunctive relief plus recovery of actual damages
and profits, or in lieu thereof, damages according to a statutory
schedule.2 However, aside from special provisions dealing with
musical 3 and dramatic24 productions, which were enacted to solve
unique problems,25 no statute has yet given a general definition of
infringement.2 6
Within the context of the literary arts,2 the failure to define
infringement raised several problems. 8 First, in comparing two
IS Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 59 (1834),
" Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4.901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841): Gray v. Russell. 10
F. Cas. 1035 (No. 5,728) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839).
20 Compare Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1964) with Copyright Act, 1790, I Stat.
124.
2' See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § i (1964).
22 See id. § 10 1.
2 1d. § I(e).
24 Id. § 1(d).
2' These sections were necessitated by decisions such as White-Smith Music Publishing Co.
v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. I (1908), which held that a music roll for a player piano and.
therefore, by inference a phonograph record,' was not a "copy" of a song.
26 "[l]nfringement is a word not defined in the statute, but is assumed to be something
already known to the law. ... Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73,
84 (6th Cir. 1943); see Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1964).
27 While copyright protection has been broadly construed to apply to nonliterary works,
see, e.g., Mayer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (figurine lamp base); Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, Ill U.S. 53 (1884) (photographs), and no reason appears why
the concept of fair use could not apply to such nonliterary works, see Firstot v. First Am.
Natural Ferns Co., 251 F. Supp. 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (artificial flowers), the concept has
been developed in cases concerning literary works and will be discussed here in that context.
25 Of course, a plaintiff cannot claim infringement unless he is the owner of a valid
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works, the identity of their contents alone could have been deemed
an infringement. However, the courts experienced little difficulty in
holding that in such situations, no infringement occurred so long as
the later work was independently produced. As a corollary, the
absence of independent production became an element in the
definition of infringement.'
A further problem arising from failure to define infringement
was that the language of the statute could have been read as
requiring exact reproduction of the entire copyrighted work in
order to constitute infringement. Such an interpretation, of course,
would permit easy invasion of exclusive rights by paraphrasing or
by exact reproduction of less than the entire text."0 Not
surprisingly, the courts blocked any such abuses. However, they
recognized that overzealous restrictions on paraphrasing could
hinder the free use and dissemination of ideas. Resolution of the
tension between these competing interests was attempted through
the verbal formula that only the mode of expression and not the
idea of a work were protected by copyright: in short, the ideas
could be used, but employment of the same mode of expression
would be deemed an infringement.' So formulated, it becomes
apparent that this second problem is basically one of determining
the level of abstraction at which use must be made of a copyrighted
work to avoid infringing upon it?2 This, in turn, became another
factor pertinent in the determination of infringement.
copyright. See generally M. NIMMER, supra note 16, § 141.1. In the discussion here it will
be assumed that the plaintiff owns such a copyright.
2' Baker v. Selden. 101 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1879) (dictum); Sampson & Murdock Co. v.
Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 541 (lst Cir. 1905); Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45, 65
(S.D.N.Y. 1957); Note, Parody and Copyright Infringement, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 585, 592
&n.33 (1956).
' Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 287 F.2d 478, 485 (9th Cir. 1961).
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 801 (1962); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 I-.2d 119, 121 (2d
Cir. 1930); see Nikanov v. Simon & Schuster, 246 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1957); West Publishing
Co. v. Lawyers Coop. Publishing Co., 79 F. 756 (2d Cir. 1897); M. NIMER, supra note
16. § 143.11; Note, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 585, 589-90 (1956).
" See Mayer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954); White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U.S. I (1908); Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899); Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99. 102-03 (1879); Manes Fabrics Co. v. Miss Celebrity, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 975
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1913). The mode-of-expression
formulation has been reenforced by the statutory provision granting the author exclusive
rights in any version of his work. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § I(b) (1964).
': "Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing
generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may
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Since some degree of nonverbatim use may be an infringement,
it seems obvious that merely leaving out a small portion of a work
and mechanically producing the remainder verbatim would not
preclude the finding of infringement." On the other hand, quoting
of some passages of a prior work would sometimes seem necessary
for effective writing, as for instance in literary criticism, scientific
works, and histories." While no simplistic formula has been offered
to resolve the policy conflict surrounding this verbatim
reproduction problem, the task is simply to determine how much, if
any, verbatim reproduction is permissible. Such a determination
must be made as a step in ascertaining infringement.
A finding of infringement, then, requires (1) absence of
independent production, and either (2) nonverbatim use at an
impermissibly low level of abstraction 5 from the text, or (3)
perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times
consists of only its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no
longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his 'ideas,' to which,
apart from their expression, his property never extended." Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930); see Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342. 348 (No. 4,901)
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
"See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1964): "The copyright provided by this title shall
protect all the copyrightable component parts of the work copyrighted. ... C. Benny v.
Loew's, Inc.. -239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir.), alj'd sub horn.. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc, v.
Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1956); National Comics Publications v. Fawcett Publications, 191
F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841);
Gray v. Russell. 10 F. Cas. 1035 (No. 5.728) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839). All of these cases
involved court prohibition of verbatim quoting of extensive portions of the copyrighted work,
3'See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966)
(history); Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539 (1st Cir. 1905)
(dictum); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (No. 8136) (1869) (criticism): Jensen, Fair
Use: As Viewed by the User, 39 DICTA 25, 28-32 (1962); Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted
Works, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDIES ON COPYRIGIIT
LAW REVISION No. 14, 8-11 (Comm. Print '1960); Yankwich, supra note 12 at 207-09. But
cf Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950) (history).
"The case of Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 287 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 801 (1962), illustrates what is meant by an impermissibly low level of
abstraction. In Bradbury the plaintiff had written an article and book in which "firemen"
were charged with the duty of burning books. The book Farenheit 451 traced the evolution
of a fireman's ideals toward his task under the influence of an "unorthodox" girl. An
infringing teleplay, "A Sound of Different Drummers," followed the same basic story line
and in addition had 22 key incidents that were almost identical to Farenheit 451. Thus,
though the use of the same basic story line would probably not have been an infringement,
i.e.. the level of abstraction at which the idea was appropriated would have been sufficiently
high, the development of the story around virtually identical incidents was appropriation at
too low a level of abstraction.
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excessive verbatim quoting of the copyrighted work? 6 Such
simplicity of statement, however, fails to reflect the difficulties
encountered by the courts in recognizing and resolving these issues.
Indeed, the courts have compounded the problem by analyzing each
issue under rubrics tending to obscure the real issues.37 Confusion
has also been engendered by subsuming different issues or
combinations thereof under the same terms.39 Thus, some courts
apparently use the single term "copying" as a shorthand for both
the first and second issues.39 Others use the term "copying" to
stand only for the first issue and employ the appellation
"substantial similarlity" when investigating the second " and third
issues." The confusion is further heightened by uncertainty as to
the demarcation between substantial similarity and "fair use," fair
use having been employed not only as the concept for resolution of
the third issue, but also as the label for the doctrine that the nature
'Seegenerally M. Ni-l'lLR. supra note 16, §§ 141.2-143.
i-or instance, the element of substantial similarity apparently had its genesis in the de
nininius doctrine of equity practice, see Note, Parody and Copyright Infringement, 56
COLUN. L. REV. 585, 593 (1956); Note, Parody and Burlesque-Fair Use or Copyright
Inlringentent? 12 ,A\D) L. Ri-v. 459. 464. 467 (1959), but has retained a label with
quantitative connotations long after the merger of law and equity. This quantitative
connotation is at variance with the frequently recited statement that quality rather than
quantity is determinative. H. BALL, supra note 6, at 335.
'"See Note, Parody and Copyright Infringement, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 585, 590-93 (1956);
notes 175-89 injra and accompanying text.
"It is agreed that to recover for . . . copyright infringement . . . the plaintiff must
prove (I) access; (2) substantial similarities between the two works; and [therefore] (3)
copying of the plaintiffs work by the defendant." Costello v. Loew's Inc., 159 F. Supp. 782,
783 (D.D.C. 1958): ej White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 17
(1908). See also Lapsley v. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 246 F. Supp.
389 (D.D.C. 1965); Richards v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 516
(D.D.C. 1958). Note, Parody and Copyright Infringentent, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 585, 590
(1956).
'""There are two principal elements. To prove infringement plaintiff must establish (1)
that plaintifrs work was copied in the allegedly infringing work, and (2) that if so, a
material and substantial portion of plaintiff's work was copied .... ." Smith v. Little,
Brown & Co.. 245 F. Supp. 451, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), afJ'd, 360 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1966). It
is indicative of the dual function served by the term "copying" that the Second Circuit has
used the term in both senses here discussed in the same opinion. "[lI]t is important to avoid
confusing two separate [essential] elements ... : (a) that defendant copied from plaintiff's
copyrighted work and (b) that the copying . . . went so far as to constitute improper
appropriation. . . . If there is evidence of access and similarities exist, then the trier of the
facts must determine whether the similarities are sufficient to prove copying." Arnstein v.
Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
" See M. NIsMnER. supra note 16, § 143.12; notes 175-90 infra and accompanying text.
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of the use can be of overriding importance in the solution of both
problems two and three .4  To avoid these semantic difficulties and
to facilitate the present analysis, unless otherwise indicated,
"appropriation" will be used only to refer to the absence of
independent production; "substantial similarlity" will include only
nonverbatim use at a low level of abstraction; and "copying" will
be considered to require both "appropriation" and "substantial
similarlity. ' 41
Appropriation
Although there can be no infringement unless some actual
appropriation of the copyrighted work has been made, access44 to
the allegedly infringed work, coupled with its similarity to the
supposedly infringing work,4" may be sufficient evidence of the
requisite appropriation." Even an identical work does not infringe
if independently produced, but depending on the potentiality for
imaginative treatment,47 similarity alone may be so striking as to
preclude any inference other than appropriation from the
copyrighted work. 8 Certainly no finder of fact would hesitate to
2 See notes 175-90 infra.
" Since the right to "copy" is one of the exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 1, the violation of which is infringement, it is arguable that "copying" should be
synonymus with "infringement" and subsume all three issues. However, when the
appropriation is verbatim, the courts seldom use the term, but instead move directly to
consideration of fair use. See, e.g.. Green v. Luby, 177 F. 287 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909); Bloom
v. Nixon, 125 F. 977 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901)
(C.C.D. 1841); KarlI v. Curtis Publishing Co., 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941). It is thus
difficult to discern ;vhether "copying" is coterminous with "infringement" or whether
infringement subsumes an additional element of "fair use." See notes 84-86 and 175-89 Inira.
"Although there is a split of authority as to whether actual access or mere opportunity
for access need be shown in light of the difficulty of obtaining direct proof of appropriation,
the latter view seems preferable. Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 245 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), affd, 360 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1966).
"The Second Circuit has expressly endorsed the use of expert analysis and testimony as
an aid to determining similarity in an appropriation contest. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154
F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); note 75 infra and accompanying text.
" See authorities cited in notes 39-40 supra.
" Thus, if a particular work is subject to great imaginative treatment, yet the allegedly
infringing work is markedly similar, it is probable that appropriation has occurred.
However, if the particular work simply cannot be imaginatively treated, the fact of similarity
alone would not be so probative of the appropriation issue.
"See Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 287 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 801 (1962); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d
49 (2d Cir. 1936).
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find appropriation if presented a verbatim similarity between two
novels or plays, 9 but identical listings in directories or indices
where the listings should correspond if both have been accurately
prepared would have no such probative value."0
The degree of similarity needed in order to enable the trier of
fact to find some appropriation is not necessarily the same as
required to establish "substantial similarity."'" Yet while the
similarity required to establish substantiality has been frequently
examined, no court has attempted to delimit the amount of
similarity which would show appropriation as a matter of law. -
Subsiantial Simnilarit'
To reconcile the public interest in free dissemination of ideas
with the protection of the copyright holder's exclusive rights,
substantial similarity, as well as appropriation, has been made a
prerequisite to an establishment of copying. 3 The substantiality
requirement may be a product of equity practice, under which the
appropriation had to be substantial enough to justify enjoining the
entire work.5 However, it also seems likely that the element arose
to accommodate the judicial difficulty experienced in discerning
impermissible nonverbatim appropriation, and the reluctance to
restrict free use of ideas if there was any uncertainty, about the
degree of appropriation."- Presently, the requirement is a
" Thus, although in theory no infringement would result if one independently produced a
literary work identical to Keats' "Ode on a Grecian Urn," practically, a court could not be
convinced that there had been no appropriation. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,
81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936).
' Compare Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936) with
Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co., 122 F. 922 (2d Cir. 1903).
" See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946). "'in some cases, the
similarities between the plaintiff's and defendant's work are so extensive and striking, as,
without more, both to justify an inference of copying [i.e., appropriation] and to prove
improper appropriation [i.e.. substantial similarity]. But such double-purpose evidence is not
required, that is, if actual copying is otherwise shown, proof of improper appropriation need
not consist of similarities which, standing alone, would support an inference of copying." Id.
"But ef. note 49 supra.
"See notes 39-40 supra. Nimmer has pointed out that substantial similarity has been used
in cases of nonverbatim copying, while similar considerations have been subsumed under the
fair use heading when the copying was verbatim. See M. NIMMER. note 16 supra, §§ 143.11
12.
" Note, Parody' and Copyright Infringement, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 585, 593 (1956); see
Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943).
" "The case, therefore, comes back at last to the naked consideration, whether the book of
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prerequisite both for equitable and legal relief, a circumstance
explained in part by the usual practice of seeking injunctive relief
along with a claim for damages. 6
Of more practical concern than the historical origin of
substantial similarity is the uncertainty as to an appropriate test for
application of the concept. A variety of tests of substantiality have
been utilized, including the pattern test, the audience test, and the
demand test. The pattern test would find substantial similarity if
the "pattern" of a work was appropriated."1 Since the term
"pattern" has no precise definition, this test does not answer the
question, but merely poses another. 8 However, by adverting to the
pattern, the test does direct attention to a relatively high level of
abstraction 9 and attempts to protect against genuinely damaging
appropriations at this high level.60 The danger of appropriation at a
highly abstract level is particularly acute in the context of the
dramatic arts, where the rendition of the same work in different
Davies, in the parts complained of, has been copied substantially from that of Emerson, or
not. It is not sufficient to show, that it may have been suggested by Emerson's, or that some
parts and pages of it have resemblances, in method and details and illustrations, to
Emerson's. It must be further shown, that the resemblances in those parts and pages arc so
close, so full, so uniform, so striking, as fairly to lead to the conclusion that the one is a
substantial copy of the other, or mainly borrowed from it. In short, that there is substantial
identity between them. A copy is one thing, an imitation or resemblance another. There are
many imitations of Homer in the Aeneid; but no one would say that the one was a copy
from the other. .... The question is, therefore, in many cases, a very nice one, what degree
of imitation constitutes an infringement of the copy-right in a particular work .. So that,
I think, it may be laid down as the clear result of the authorities in cases of this nature, that
the true test of piracy or not is to ascertain whether the defendant has, in fact, used the plan,
arrangements, and illustrations of the plaintiff, as the model of his own book, with colorable
alterations and variations only to disguise the use thereof; or whether his work is the result
of his own labor, skill, and use of common materials and common sources or knowledge,
open to all men, and the resemblances are either accidental or arising from the nature of the
subject .... " Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 622, 624 (No. 4,436) (C.C.D. Mass.
1845); G. CURTIS, COPYRIGHT 258 (1847).
6 See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1964).
"7See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 902 (1931); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (C.C.D. Mass.
1845); Grove Press Inc. v. Greenleaf Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp. 518, 525 (E.D.N.Y.
1965); Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 245 F. Supp. 451, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), a]ffi, 360 1-.2d
928 (1966); Richard v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 516 (D.D.C.
1958); Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1, 45 COLUNI. L. REv. 503, 513-14
(1945); Nimmer, Inroads on Copyright Protection, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1127-33 (1951);
Note, Parody and Copyright Infringement, 56 COLuI. L. REV. 585, 592-93 (1956).
"See Chafee, note 57 supra, at 513-14.
' 
9 See notes 32 and 35 supra.
W Id.; M. NIMMER, note 16 supra, § 143.52, at 638.
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media may of necessity. result in a surface dissimalarity. 6'
Advocates of the pattern test argue that such surface dissimilarity
might delude the unaided lay juror into finding no appropriation.
Therefore, they suggest that the court should avail itself of experts
to assist in determining the level at which appropriation did occur.62
In contrast to the pattern test, the audience test discourages
expert analysis to determine the level of abstraction at which any
nonverbatim appropriation has been made.63 Under the audience
test, similarity is deemed substantial if the average reasonable man
would spontaneously and immediately detect the literary piracy
without any aid or suggestion or critical analysis by others.64
Although the audience test has broad support in the case law,65 it is
susceptible to telling criticism.66 Its rejection of expert analysis
reduces its utility as a universal test of substantiality. 67
"' 'The statute giving authors of copyrighted works the exclusive right to dramatize them
must receive a reasonably liberal application or it will be wholly ineffective .. " Bradbury
v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 287 F.2d 478, 484 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 801 (1962). That is true because "[i]t is impossible to make a play out of a story-to
represent a narrative by dialogue and action-without making changes . Dam v. Kirke
La Shelle Co., 175 F. 902, 907 (2d Cir. 1910).
":See M. Ni MER. note 16 supra, §§ 143.52-53; cf. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d
Cir. 1946) (court expressly employed expert analysis to determine if there was appropriation
but left the question of substantiality to the audience test).
" See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp. v. Stonesifer. 140 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 1944); Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65
I-.2d I. 18 (9th Cir.). ceri. denied. 296 U.S. 669 (1933): Costello v. Loew's, Inc., 159 1-.
Supp. 782, 784 (D.D.C. 1958).
" Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d I, 18 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 669
(1933).
"'See, e.g., White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. I, 17 (1907); Ideal
Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1966); Bradbury v. Columbia
Broadcasting System. Inc., 287 I-.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1961), ceri. denied. 368 U.S. 801 (1962);
Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d I,
18 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 669 (1933); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d
119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931): Manes Fabrics Co., v. Miss Celebrity,
Inc., 246 F. Supp. 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Lapsley v. American Institute of Pub. Accountants,
246 F. Supp. 389 (D.D.C. 1965); Hedeman Prods. Corp. v. Tap-Rite Prods. Corp., 228 F.
Supp. 630 (D.N.J. 1964); Costello v. Loews, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 782 (D.D.C. 1958).
' See generally M. NIMMER, note 16 supra, § 143.52.
"'See id.; c. Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d I (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 296 U.S.
669 (1933). While the average reasonable man may well be able to detect many forms of
literary piracy, he could not be expected to recognize some of the more subtle and complex
forms. Application of the audience test to all infringement cases will therefore produce a
certain amount of inaccuracy and injustice, which could be avoided by employment of a
more sensitive test.
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Furthermore, the average reasonable man standard employed by
the test ignores the fact that the work's actual audience might not
consist of average reasonable men." Indeed, no attempt has been
made to refine the average reasonable man test so as to incorporate
special attributes and knowledge of particular audiences, as has
occurred in the analogous concept of the reasonably prudent man
in tort law. However, one decision expressly recognized that the
average reasonable man standard was being applied because the
audience to whom the work was directed was composed of such
persons. 9 It could therefore be argued that a potential audience of
average reasonable men is a condition for the application of the audi-
ence test,7" or alternatively, that special attributes of the audience
should be considered.
Even if the audience test was refined to account for variations
in the intended audience, it would still retain the deficiency of
oversimplifying the substantiality issue for jury consideration. The
jury, however, is seldom the trier of fact in a copyright case.,'
Thus, in a typical year, only four-tenths of one percent of the
copyright cases terminated went to a jury trial,1" there being only
two jury trials in the entire country. The vast majority of copyright
cases are bench trials, and certainly judges are'capable of handling
the complexities of analysis and the broadened issues encompassed
by a more realistic test. Furthermore, in actual practice, judges as
the triers of fact do engage in detailed dissention and analysis."
68 The inadequacy of the reasonable man test probably explains why the cases employing it
have uniformly concerned works directed to the public generally and why the courts have
turned to fair use rather than substantiality as the tool of analysis when the works involved
were of a scientific or technical nature. See notes 177-78 infra.
" Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). The standard was "[I]ay listeners, who
comprise the audience for whom such popular music is composed. ... Id. at 473.
70 Assuming that audience reaction is merely a relevant factor to consider in applying the
demand test and not an exclusive test, see notes 79-80 infra and accompanying text, this
interpretation would be preferable to consideration of special attributes of the audience. If
such attributes are to be considered, certainly expert testimony from persons possessing such
attributes would be required, and if experts are to be used, it would seem more pertinent to
seek expert opinion on the effect on demand for the allegedly infringed work.
' This is true despite an apparent attempt by the Second Circuit to encourage jury trials
by discouraging dismissals of failure to state a claim and summary judgment. See Arnstein
v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); MacDonald v. Du Maurier, 144 F.2d 696 (2d Cir.
1944); Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1939). But see Tralins v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 160 F. Supp. 5 11 (D. Mo. 1958).
11 1964 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 226.
"A perusal of the infringement cases indicates that in most cases the judge engages in
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Even if the level of abstraction or the amount of verbatim
reproduction can be ascertained under either the pattern or
audience test, neither of these tests develop adequate criteria for
measuring substantial similarity. Thus, under both tests, the typical
opinion merely analyzes the works involved to determine what
similarities exist and then states the conclusion that the similarity is
substantial without identifying the determinative factors. A rnstein
v. Porter"5 seemed to sanction just such a procedure for, although
approving the use of expert analysis in determining the issue of
appropriation, it eschewed all analysis in determining whether the
appropriation was so substantial as to be prohibited."6 However,
while continuing to rely on the audience test, the Arnstein court
suggests a major factor of substantiality. According to the Arnstein
court, substantial similarity turned on
whether defendant took from plaintiffs works so much of what is
pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience Jbr
whomn such popular music is composed, that dcfendant wrongfully
appropriated something which belongs to the plaintifj'
Thus defined, the audience test becomes a measure of appropriation
of the copyright owner's exclusive interest in audience appeal. Since
an appropriation of audience appeal would adversely affect
demand, the audience test appears highly related to a demand test
in its measurement of the economic detriment at different points in
the chain of causation." Since demand can be reduced by using a
such analysis. E.g.. Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 287 F.2d 478 (9th Cir.
1961) (dissenting opinion), ceri. denied, 368 U.S. 801 (1962); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 I-.2d
464 (2d Cir. 1946); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936): Harold
Lloyd Corp. v. Witmer, 65 F.2d I (9th Cir.). cer, denied, 296 U.S. 669 (1933); Fristot v. First
Am. Natural Ferns Co.. 251 F. Supp. 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Richards v. Columbia Broadcast-
ing System. Inc., 161 1-. Supp. 516 (D.D.C. 1958); American Visual Corp. v. Holland, 162 F.
Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Simonton v. Gordon, 12 F.2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1925).
See authorities cited in note 73 supra.
154 I-.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). Arnstein, appearing pro re, was apparently a professional
copyright plaintiff with a history of five previous suits who alleged that Cole Porter works
such as "Begin the Beguine," "My Heart Belongs to Daddy," and "Night and Day" were
plagiarized from certain of his own copyrighted and uncopyrighted work such as "'The Lord
is My Shepard," and "A Mother's Prayer." The state discussion of expert testimony was
volunteered in an enumeration of the elements of infringement preparatory to rulings on the
trial court's granting of summary judgment to the defendant. Id. at 467.
"o Id. at 468. 472-73.
"Id. at 473 (emphasis added).
"The audience test attempts to measure the decreased value of the copyright holder's
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work without direct reliance on those features which create its
unique audience appeal,7 9 the demand test makes possible
consideration of a greater number of relevant factors than does the
audience test. This greater breadth of the demand test, combined
with its closer approximation to the economic philosophy of the
constitutional grant,80 would seem to make it better suited for
accomplishing the intended function of substantial similarity in the
widely varying contexts in which copyright is asserted. The demand
test also seems to serve the interest of the pattern test in preventing
concealment of an economically damaging use behind changes
necessitated by a transfer of medium. Therefore, under a demand
test, both the similarity of pattern and the reduction in audience
appeal remain factors, but not the exclusive criteria, in determining
substantial similarity."1
FAIR USE
Like the concepts of appropriation and substantial similarity,
the doctrine of fair use is frequently judicially employed in the
resolution of copyright infringement. However, the uncertainty as
to the doctrine's function, rationale, and elements has contributed
to the prevailing confusion in copyright cases. In applying this
difficult concept, the courts have avoided legal analysis by
emphasizing that fair use is a question of fact, turning on the
rights by determining the degree to which his work's audience appeal is lessened, The demand
test, however, seeks to ascertain 'iminution of value by measuring the lessened market
demand for the copyrighted work. By using a market gauge, the demand test measures the
economic detriment caused by infringement in more direct monetary terms.
"See notes 102-04 infra and accompanying text.
'
0 See notes 95-97 infra and accompanying text.
"It has been said that utilization of the demand test in determining substantial similarity
is merely the result of mistaken reliance on fair use cases. Note, Parodt and Copyright
Infringement, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 585, 592 (1956). Nevertheless, three circuits and a noted
commentator have endorsed the test at various times. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold
Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 361 (9th Cir. 1947); Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer Bee Co.,
135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943); National Institute, Inc., for the Improvement of Memory v.
Nutt. 28 1-.2d 132, 135 (D. Conn. 1928). aJId, 31 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1929); H. BALI. TIll
LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 334 (1944). Still this is a rather limited
recognition, and, therefore, the anatomy of the demand test in the context of substantiality
has not been explored. Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer Bee Co., supra at 85, however,
indicates that the demand test of substantiality is "like" the demand test of fair use, so that
the analysis in the context of fair use seems applicable here. For analysis of the demand test,
see notes 95-104 infra and accompanying text.
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particular circumstances of each case." Of course, every case turns
on its own facts, but the difficulty of generalization alone should
not inhibit courts from stating more specific, guidelines for future
decision."-
Although most attempts at defining fair use have been
singularly unhelpful,84 one which has gained relatively wide
acceptance explains fair use as a "privilege in others than the owner
of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable
manner without . . . consent . . . ."I While debate persists as to
whether fair use is a privilege and therefore a defense to be assessed
after a finding of infringement, or whether it is an element the
absence of which must be established to prove infringement,86 the
definition does delineate the doctrine's broad function of permitting
some amount of nonconsensual use of copyrighted material.
However, this definition provides no helpful guide for a court
in determining the fair use question in a particular case. No
more helpful are the numerous catalogues of factors" which
contain only very general, undefined terms with no indication of
their relative weights or interrelationships. Certainly, a specific
"See Peter Pan Fabrics. Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960);
Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 246 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1957); Mathews Conveyor
Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943). Since most copyright cases are tried
without a jury, the primary practical results of classification of fair use as a question of fact
are that the appellate courts will be reluctant to review lower court findings, see Eisenschiml
v. -awcett Publications, Inc., supra, and the lower courts may be more reluctant to grant
judgment on the pleadings. See notes 71 supra and 188 infra.
' See Addison-Wsley Publishing Co. v. Brown. 223 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
"See M. NIMXMER, COPYRIGHT, § 145 (1966); A. WELL. AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 429-
32 (1917); Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, in COPYRIGHT AND RELATED Topics
105, 108 (Los Angeles Copyright Soc'y & U.C.L.A. Law School ed. 1964).
" H. BALI. %upra note 81, at 260. See al.3o Schulman, Fair Use and The Reri.,ion ol the
Copyright Act, 53 IOWA L. REV. 832 (1968).
" Cohen, supra note 84, at 109-10; Latman, supra note 34, at 6-7. Modern commentators,
see H. BALL. supra note 81, at 260; M. NIMMER. supra note 84, at § 145, including the
British, see W. COPINGER & S. JAMES, COPYRIGHT § 460 (10th ed. 1965), tend to classify
fair use as a defense. See note 188 infra and accompanying text.
"See. e.g.. Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943);
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. 1841); Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas.
1035 (No. 5,728) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting
Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955); Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359
(S.D.N.Y. 1914); Cohen, supra note 84; Latman, Fair Use oJ Copyrighted Works. SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY. 86TH CONG.. 2D SESS.. STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION
No. 145 (Comm. print 1960); Yankwich, What is Fair Use? 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 204
(1954).
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rationale with which to isolate the most helpful factors and
determine their interrelationships is needed.
The Rationale of Fair Use and Its Primary Factors
The initial explanation of fair use, offered by early English and
American decisions, was that either custom of the literary
community 9 or the implied consent of the author90 sanctioned some
non-consensual use of a copyrighted work. The more recent cases,
however, have traced the doctrine to policies underlying the
constitutional grant of power.9 Since the present Copyright Act
states, "'The copyright provided by this title shall protect all the
copyrightable component parts of the work copyrighted . .. . ,
and many of the cases invoking fair use have involved verbatim
reproduction of copyrighted language seemingly in violation of the
Act, the courts have understandably looked to the Constitution to
justify a concept that arguably circumvents an express statutory
command.93 Indeed, the Second Circuit has expressly declared that
"the fundamental justification for . . . fair use . . . lies in the
constitutional purpose in granting copyright protection in the first
"The earliest and most frequently cited of such listings is found in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.
Cas. 342, 344 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. 1841): "[Tlhe identity of the two works in substance, and
the question of piracy, often depends upon a fiice balance of the comparative use made in
one of the materials of the other: the nature, extent and value of the materials thus used; the
objects of each work; and the degree to which each writer may be fairly presumed to have
resorted to the same common sources .... "
"See Dodsley v. Kinnersley, 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (1761); H. BALL, supra note 81, at 260; A,
VEIL. supra note 84, at 429-30; Latman, supra note 87, at 15; Note, Parody and Copyright
Infringeinent, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 585, 595 (1956); 15 So. CAL. L. REV. 249, 250 (1942).
"E.g., Sampson & Murdock v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 541 (Ist Cir. 1905);
Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938): see M.
NI.IMER, supra note 84, at § 145; authorities cited note 89 supra. Not only is the implied
consent rationale a fiction, but it is also inconsistent with the principle that restrictive
statements in the copyright notice apparently add nothing to the protection. M. N! immER,
supra note 84, at § 145; Cohen, supra note 84, at 106; Note, Parody and Copyright
Infringements, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 585, 595 (1956).
"See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied. 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); Note, Parody and Burlesque-Fair Use or Copyright
Infringement? 12 VAND. L. REv. 459, 472 (1959). See also Chafee, supra note 57, at 511;
Latman, supra note 87, at 7.
" Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1964).
"See M. NIMMER, supra note 84, at § 143.12; notes 164-72 infra and accompanying text.
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instance." 94 Under Article I, Section 8, Congress is granted power
"to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts . . ." (the
constitutional purpose), "by securing . . . to Authors . . . the
exclusive Right to their . . . Writings . . ." (the constitutional
method). Reasoning from the method clause, the Supreme Court
has asserted that the basic philosophy of the Constitution's
copyright clause is an economic one, which persuades that since
"6encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best
way to advance public welfare . . . "I the public welfare will not
be defeated if the use of the copyrighted work by another does not
in fact reduce the economic benefit to the individual copyright
holder. 6
Apparently relying on this economic rationale, lower federal
courts have held that an important factor in the determination of
fair use is whether the unauthorized use causes a diminution in
demand for the copied work.97 "Diminution in demand" would
clearly be found upon a showing of an actual invasion of the
market for the allegedly infringed work by a competitive work."
" Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). This ground of the Rosemiont decision could be distinguished,
since the court also found that there had been no showing that the Random House book
lessened economic benefit of the article, the copyright of which was held by Rosemont, since
there was no current income being derived from the article, no definite plans for its
expansion to a biography, and the two works were not directly competitive. Id. at 305.
However, to conclude that the value of the copyrighted article was not diminished seems very
doubtful. Certainly such publication diminished the market for any biography that
Rosemont might eventually publish.
" Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); accord, Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc.
v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 319 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). While the personal gain philosophy may not
be universally valid, especially where writers and artists are involved, it still retains a great
deal of merit. Therefore, for purposes of this comment, its validity will be accepted.
" Chafee, note 57 supra, at 507. Since creative production is likely to be discouraged to
some degree whenever copying might reduce the economic benefit, the position that actual
economic injury is required to offend the public welfare seems questionable.
" E.g.. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d
546 (7th Cir. 1965); Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943);
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841); Gray v. Russell, 10 F.
Cas. 1035 (No. 5,728) (C.C.D. Mass. 1839); Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., Inc. v. Brown,
23 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co.. 23 F.
Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938); Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc.. 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914). G.
Ricordi & Co. v. Mason. 201 F. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); Hartford Printing Co. v. Hartford
Directory & Publishing Co.. 146 F. 332 (D. Conn. 1906).
"See Latman, supra note 87, at 14-16.
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Thus, a foreign language word list which copied extensively from a
previously copyrighted list was not justified as a fair use and
infringed that copyright because it filled the same demand.99 In
contrast, a synopsis of an opera's plot appearing in a book
explaining the opera was held a fair use because, if anything, such
use increased demand for the opera.'00 Moreover, actual damage is
not always required to preclude a finding of fair use, for obviously
only potential "diminution of demand" need be shown to obtain an
injunction. Even in a suit for damages, the present copyright statute
apparently provides for minimum damages, if actual damages
cannot be proved with sufficient specificity.' 01 Thus, the demand
test may be satisfied where the economic impact on the copyrighted
work has only a very remote causal connection with the
nonconsensual use. For example, a diminution of demand was
found where the potentiality of diminished demand for a scientific
book arose as a result of the unfavorable impact which its
unauthorized commercial use had upon the writer's reputation; 12
where prejudice to sales of a textbook accrued because of
production of an answer sheet for the book's questions;' and
where the advertising value of a free sales pamphlet was reduced by
its use in another advertisement. 0 4
The diminution-of-demand factor alone, however, does not
always explain judicial reliance on the doctrine of fair use, as a
comparison of the facts of two well-known cases demonstrates. On
the one hand, the demand test justifies the decision in Henry Holt
& Co. v. Liggett and Myers Tobacco Co.,' °5 where a district court
found that the use in a cigarette advertisement of three sentences
9 College Entrance Book Co. v. Amsco Book Co., 119 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1941).
G. Ricordi & Co. v. Mason, 201 F. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).
,o, "If any person shall infringe the copyright in any work protected under the copyright
laws of the United States such person shall be liable:. . .To pay to the copyright proprietor
such damages as the copyright proprietor may have suffered due to the infringement, as well as
all the profits which the infringer shall have made from such infringement . . .or in lieu of
actual damages and profits, such damages as to the court shall appear to be just, and in
assessing such damages the court may, in its discretion, allow the amounts as hereinafter
stated ...." Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1964); see M. NIMMER. .supra note 84,
at § 154.11.
101 Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
"I3 Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
'14 Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1965) (district court
had assumed that there was no economic injury if the pamphlet was free),
10123 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938).
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from a book on the care of the voice was not a fair use. The works
were not competitive, but the use in advertising of the author's
conclusion apparently damaged his reputation and therefore
reduced the demand for his book) 6 On the other hand, in Bloom &
Hamlin v. Nixon,0 7 the use by an entertainer of a chorus of a
copyrighted song to parody the style of another entertainer was
held a fair use) " The court concluded that "surely a parody would
not infringe the copyright of the work parodied, merely because a
few lines of the original might be textually reproduced."'0 9 The
Henry Holt case and Bloom might be distinguished on the basis
that there was no damage to the writer's reputation in Bloom and
therefore no economic detriment. Such a dinstinction, however,
may be criticized as ignoring the fact that the chorus's public
performance, even a parody, was filling a part of the demand for
the song for which the author was receiving no compensation."
If the demand test cannot adequately reconcile Henry Holt and
Bloom, some factor other than the demand test may be
determinative. However, since the demand test has been related to
the constitutional policy,"' it would seem that any impingment on
that test would require similar justification. Indeed, some further
rationale of fair use may be found in the constitutional purpose
clause, which, by expressly authorizing the granting of exclusive
rights to authors, was intended to promote the arts and sciences. If
it can be established that certain uses of copyrighted material are
by their nature more conducive to the promotion of the arts and
"The court apparently accepted the plaintiff's allegation that use of the "work in
advertising matter of this nature has cast reflections upon his professional ethics and has
brought down upon him the term 'commercialist,' all of which has contributed to negative
and deter the sale of the book .. ." Id. at 303. Thus, the demand test was found to be
satisfied. However, the court then went on to consider the nature of the appropriating work,
and held that although the use of exact words of the appropriated work might have been
justified by some types of use, it was not justified by an advertising use. Id. at 304. See notes
127-30 injra and accompanying text.
"' 125 F. 977 (E.D. Pa. 1903).
'"Accord. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denlied. 379 U.S.
822 (1964) (rhyme scheme and identical lines from songs in Mad Magazine): Karll v. Curtis
Publishing Co.. 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941) (chorus of Green Bay Packers fight song
in magazine article).
" 125 F..at 978.
""See Benny v. Loe%'s. Inc.. 239 I-.2d 532. 535-36 (9th Cir. 1956). all'd suwb iam.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. loew's. Inc.. 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
" See notes 91-96 supra and accompanying text.
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sciences than others, then arguably a greater amount of diminution
in demand must be shown to justify a finding of infringement."'
Such analysis is supported by the language of the recent case of
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.," 3 which
indicated that the nature of the use is the initial consideration in
resolving the ultimate question of infringement-. Implicitly relying
on the purpose clause, the Second Circuit in Rosemont stated its
understanding of the doctrine of fair use:
Whether the privilege [of fair use] may justifiably be applied to
particular materials turns initially on the nature of the materials,
e.g., whether their distribution would serve the public interest in
free dissemination of information and whether their preparation
requires some use of prior materials dealing with the same subject
matter. Consequently the privilege has been applied to works in the
fields of-science, law, medicine, history and biography.'
Since the majority of all copyright cases are decided in the
Second Circuit"5 and since the Supreme Court has made no ruling
on the matter, the Second Circuit recognition of the nature of the
use as a factor in fair use must be considered the currently
prevailing view. However, the Ninth Circuit, which also hears a
significant number of copyright cases," ' has indicated some
reluctance to accept this view. In Benny v. Loew's Inc.,"7 the Ninth
"'See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.
1964); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 343 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841); Greenbie v.
Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Thompson v. Gernsback, 94 F. Supp. 453
(S.D.N.Y. 1950); cf. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
" 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). For a detailed
description of the facts of Rosemont, see text accompanying notes 137-39 infra.
" 366 F.2d at 307.
11 1965 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 182-97. The statistics for copyright, patent, and trademark are combined so that an
exact comparison of copyright statistics cannot be made. However, in this combined
category, 484 cases were commenced in the district courts of the Second Circuit in 1965, as
compared to the next largest number, 239, in the Ninth Circuit. Thus over one-fourth of all
cases in the combined category were in the Second Circuit. Id. at 180, 183. This figure
probably understates the percentage of copyright cases, since the types of cases tend to be
grouped geographically. For instance, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, with their high
industrial concentration, would tend to have a higher proportion of patent cases, and the
Ninth and Second Circuits as entertainment centers would tend to have a higher proportion
of copyright cases.
"d. at 187.
' 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), aJj'dsub nora. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
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Circuit held that fair use did not apply to a televised parody in
which the entire copyrighted script of a movie was used almost
verbatim. In so ruling, the court implied that there could be no fair
use if there was substantial similarity."8 Such a rule, equating fair
use with the absence of substantial similarity, would eliminate any
separate function for fair use. Furthermore, if substantial similarity
is determined by the audience test, the Ninth Circuit ruling
effectively eliminates specific consideration of either the diminution
in demand or the nature of the use factors. However, a subsequent
opinion by the district court that had initially decided Benny
apparently recognized nature of the use as an element to be
considered, though not as a defense per se."9 Nevertheless, no
retraction of the Benny rule that nature of the use is not a
consideration has occurred. While the Benny doctrine has been
resoundingly condemned by the commentators, 20 constitutional
history lends some support to its validity. Both the language of the
granting clause' and its prior history'22 indicate that the framers
Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (evenly divided court). The affirmance by the evenly)
divided Supreme Court is of no precedential value. Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 213-14
(1910). For a more complete discussion of the Benny precedent, see notes 175-82 infra and
accompanying text.
"' Id. See notes 175-82 infra and accompanying text.
", Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal.
1955). "When the alleged infringing work is of the same character as the copyrighted work,
viz., a serious work with a taking from another serious copyrighted work, then the line is
drawn more strictly than when a farce or comedy or burlesque takes from a serious
copyrighted work or vice versa . . . . The defense, 'I only burlesqued' the copyrighted
material is not per se a defense ... ." Id. at 350. However, the court still phrased its
opinion in terms of substantiality and not fair use. See notes 164-70 infra. Still, the district
court's approach varies considerably from the Benny opinion where fair use seemed to be
limited to cases where "a writer may be guided by earlier copyrighted works, may consult
original authorities, and may use those which he considers applicable in support of his own
original text." Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir.), affd sub norw., Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
:'See, e.g., Jensen, Fair Use: As Viewed by the "User." 39 DICTA 25 (1962); Comment,
Parody and the Law of Copyright, 29 FORDHAM L. REV. 570 (1961); Note, Parody and
Copyright Infringement, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 585 (1956);Note, Parody and Burlesque-Fair
Use or Copyright Infringement? 12 \,AND. L. REV. 459 (1959).
"' See note 17 supra.
1"2See generally Selvin, Parody and Burlesque of Copyrighted Works as Infringement. 6
BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 53 (1958). Both the deliberations surrounding the resolution of the
Continental Congress recommending state copyright legislation, see note 15 supra; 24
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 326 (1922), and the passage of the related state
legislation, see Copyright Enactments, COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. No. 3, at 1-21 (1963), seem
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assumed that the constitutional method of granting exclusive rights
would invariably advance the constitutional purpose of promoting
the arts and sciences. Arguably, therefore, the Constitution left no
leeway for discrimination between types of uses.' -3
Assuming the validity of the nature of use factor, an
examination of the cases reveals a double aspect to this theory.
Although the label "'nature of the use" would seem to concentrate
on the characterization of the appropriating work, the nature of the
appropriated work has been considered.'24 Thus, in Rosemont the
court seemingly was persuaded to find fair use by the fact that the
appropriated work was an exclusive source of part of the
biographical data on a public figure.'25 In like manner, courts
undoubtedly consider that certain copyrighted reference and
scientific books derive their marketability from the prospect of
subsequent reproduction of at least some of the information that
they contain.'26 However, separate analysis of the appropriated and
appropriating works occurs infrequently, since works involved
usually fit within the same broad classification and the courts
simply conclude that the particular use is justified because the
appropriating work is within some broad classification such as
critique, history, or reference.
to assume the identity of the method and purpose of these copyright enactments in much the
same way as the language of the constitutional grants. See also 5 ELIOT, DEBATES ON THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 439-40 (1937).
':
3 See Selvin, note 122 supra, at 58.
': The present copyright bill refers to the "purpose" of the copyrighted work; however, the
section apparently was not intended to make a technical distinction between "nature" and
"purpose." See note 140 infra. Moreover, the bill distinguishes between the nature of the
appropriated and the appropriating work, so that both works apparently are to be
characterized as to the type of use. See note 192 infra.
'
2 5 See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). See also Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 350 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
': "The copyright of a work on mathematical science cannot give to the author an
exclusive right to the methods of operation which he propounds, or to the diagrams which he
employs to explain them. so as to prevent an engineer from using them whenever occasion
requires. The very object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to
communicate to the world the useful knowledge which it contains. But this object would be
frustrated if the knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the
book. And where the art it teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and
diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such as are similar to them, such methods and
diagrams are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given therewith to the
public; not given for the purpose of publication in other works explanatory of the art, but for
the purpose of practical application.
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Interrelationship of the Primary Factors
Assuming that the Second Circuit's Rosemont rule' -7 will
prevail, two factors have been isolated-diminution of demand and
nature of the use-which, because of their close relationship to the
underlying constitutional- policies, must be considered to be the
primary components of fair use. However, isolation of factors is of
little assistance unless their interrelationship can be ascertained so
as to furnish a guide for decision making. Since both primary
factors are grounded in a clause of the constitutional grant, the
relationship between the policies enunciated in those clauses is
peculiarly significant to the interaction of the factors. The clearest
articulation of this relationship is found in Berlin v. E.C.
Publications, Inc.,2 where the Second Circuit stated:
While indeed broad, the area in which a copyright proprietor is
permitted the exclusive commercial benefit of his copyrighted work
is clearly not without limit. In the words of Article I, Section 8, of
the Constitution, copyright protection is designed "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts," and the financial reward
guaranteed to the copyright holder is but an incident of this general
objective, rather than an end in itself. As a result, courts in passing
upon particular claims of infringement must occasionally
subordinate the copyright holder's interest in a maximum financial
return to the greater public interest in the development of art,
science and industry.' -29
The interrelationship suggested in the Berlin decision may be
applied to the primary factors of fair use as substituted for their
"Of course, these observations are not intended to apply to ornamental designs, or
pictorial illustrations addressed to the taste. Of these it may be said, that their form is their
essence, and their object the production of pleasure in their contemplation. This is their Final
end. They are as much the produce of genius and the result of composition, as are the lines
of the poet or the historian's periods. On the other hand, the teachings of science and the
rules and methods of useful art have their final end in application and use: and this
application and use are what the public derive from the publication of a book which teaches
them." Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1879).
See note 114 %upra.
329 1-.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964), ceri. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964). Berlin concerned
reproduction of the rhyme scheme and some lines verbatim in a Mad Magazine spoof of
current events. Like Rosemont. Berlin's discussion of the constitutional bases of fair use and
its disapproval of Benn,," can be classed as dicta, since the court found that the most rigorous
application of the substantial similarity test would find no infringement here, id. at 545: the
rigor of the court's analysis indicates that this is highly reliable dicta.
" Id. at 543-44 (emphasis added).
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respective constitutional bases. Under this analysis if the initial
inquiry shows that non-consensual use has caused no diminution in
demand, the use will be fair, thus eliminating the need to consider
the nature of the use. However, if diminution in demand occurs, the
nature of the use must be considered to determine whether the
economic interest of the copyright holder is to be subordinated. "0
Since Berlin says that it is the "maximum" financial interest of the
copyright holder that may be "occasionally" subordinated, it would
seem that the nature of the use may justify some diminution in
financial return, but that this would be the exceptional case.
Since the framers of the Constitution seemed to assume that
granting exclusive rights to an author would promote the arts and
sciences,"' the restraint shown by the Berlin court in indicating that
the courts should find the nature of the use determinative only
occasionally seems wise. However, the later Rosemont decision
suggests that greater weight will be given to nature of the use.",
Nevertheless, constitutional history, plus the danger inherent in a
judicial license to favor one work over another,"' would seem to
dictate caution in deciding whether or not the nature of the use
justifies a diminution in demand. It would therefore seem that, in
designating a particular use as preferred, a court should not resort
to its unaided discretion but instead should look for assistance in
constitutional clauses other than the copyright clause, in copyright
statutes, and in case law precedents.
The first amendment is the most likely source of constitutional
policies justifying preferential treatment of certain kinds of uses.
"'See Note, Parody and Copyright Infringement, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 585, 603 (1956);
Note, Parody and Burlesque-Fair Use or Copyright Infringement, 12 "'AND. L. REv. 459,
478 (1959); note 106 supra.
"I See notes 121-22 supra.
" See note 114 supra.
"' Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (Holmes, J.).
Addressing himself to the copyright ability of circus advertising posters, the eminent justice
cautioned: "it would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the
narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme some works of genius would be sure
to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive . . . . It may be more
than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would
have been sure of protection when seen for the first'time. At the other end, copyright would
be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they
command the interest of any public . . . the taste of any public is not to be treated with
contempt." Id. at 251-52.
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For instance, New York Times v. Sullivan'34 and Time, Inc. v.
Hill' ' indicate that the policy favoring dissemination of
information about and criticism of public figures is sufficiently
strong to proscribe a libel or invasion of privacy action by such
persons in the absence of actual malice. That same policy would
seem to support rather extensive non-consensual use of the
utterances of public figures. In fact, in the case of governmental
officials performing official duties, the policy favoring free
dissemination of information is so strong that their statements
would probably not be copyrightable in the first instance.'36 In the
case of public figures other than acting governmental officials, a
copyright would be granted to protect their writings, but would be
implemented by a rather broad application of fair use. Thus, the
New York Times policy seems to have had decisive influence in the
determination of fair use in Rosemont.'37 Rosemont, a corporation
controlled by associates of Howard Hughes, purchased the
copyright in a magazine article that was apparently the only
authoritative source of biographical information about a
substantial portion of Hughes' life. Claiming a violation of the
copyright, Rosemont sought an injunction against Random House
to prevent distribution of a book which evinced significant reliance
on the magazine article.'38 The Second Circuit, in reversing the
grant of an injunction, was obviously concerned that issuance of
the injunction would result in suppression of information about a
public figure, for it asserted that the right to privacy "must be
tempered by a countervailing privilege that the public have some
information."' 39
"' 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
.. 385 U.S. 374 (1967) ("knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth").
"' See Public Affairs Press v. Rickover, 369 U.S. I1I (1962). The Rickover case turned-on
whether the speeches of a governmental official were publications of the United States
government and, hence, not copyrightable under 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1964). The question was not
resolved by the court because of an inadequate record below; however, the Copyright
Bill § 105 defines a work of the United States government as "... a work prepared by an
officer of the United States government as part of his official duties." Of course, the
question is only changed, not answered, by this section, and an investigation of the official
duties of the complaining official is called for, an inquiry of considerable complexity when
the official is in a high position in the government.
"' 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), ceri. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
"'See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
"1 366 F.2d at 309.
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In addition to the constitutional policy favoring free
dissemination, the codification of fair use in the pending copyright
legislation will probably be a primary source of preferred uses,
since it summarizes some of the "purposes"'' 0 which have been held
to be a fair use. The statutory listing of preferred uses"' includes, for
example, criticism,1 2 comment,' 3 news reporting,4 ' scholarship,"'
"'The Copyright Bill § 106 requires consideration of the "purpose and character" of the
use and the "nature" of the copyright work. The terms "nature," "purpose" and "character"
apparently are not intended to have any technical meaning since the committee report uses
the terms "nature" and "character" interchangeably. See H.R. REP. No. 83.
Compare the detailed provisions of the British counterpart:
"6.-(l) No fair dealing with a literary, dramatic or musical work for purposes of
research or private study shall constitute an infringement of the copyright in the work.
" (2) No fair dealing with a literary, dramatic or musical work shall constitute an
infringement of the copyright in the work if it is for purposes of criticism or review, whether
of that work or of another work, and is accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement.
"(3) No fair dealing with a literary, dramatic or musical work shall constitute an
infringement of the copyright in the work if it is for the purpose of reporting current
events-(a) in a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical, or (b) by means of broadcasting,
or in a cinematograph film, and, in a case falling within paragraph (a) of this subsection, is
accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement.
"(4) The copyright in a literary, dramatic or musical work is not infringed by
reproducing it for the purposes of a judicial proceeding, or for the purposes of a report of a
judicial proceeding.
"(5) The reading or recitation in public by one person of any reasonable extract from a
published literary or dramatic work, if accompanied by a sufficient acknowledgement, shall
not constitute an infringement of the copyright in the work:
"Provided that this subsection shall not apply to anything done for the purposes of
broadcasting.
" (6) The copyright in a published literary or dramatic work is not infringed by the
inclusion of a short passage therefrom in a collection intended for the use of schools, if (a)
the collection is described in its title, and in any advertisements thereof issued by or on
behalf of the publisher, as being so intended, and (b) the work in question was not published
for the use of schools, and (c) the collection consists mainly of material in which no
copyright subsists, and (d) the inclusion of the passage is accompanied by a sufficient
acknowledgment:
"Provided that this subsection shall not apply in relation to the copyright in a work if, in
addition to the passage in question, two or more other excerpts from works by the author
thereof (being works in which copyright subsists at the time when the collection is published)
are contained in that collection, or are contained in that collection taken together with every
similar collection (if any) published by the same publisher within the period of five years
immediately preceding the publication of that collection."
"' H.R. REP. No. 83.
" No American case has held a use to be fair because it was a critique, but many
decisions in die'ta have indicated that use may be made of portions of a criticized work in a
critique. See, e.g.. Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 61 (No. 8,136) (C.C.D, Mass. 1869).
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 [No. 4,901] (C.C.D. Mass. 1841); Consumer's Union
v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 189 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220
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and research. 146 One use listed in the current bill, teaching, had
previously been held not to justify reproduction of substantially all
of a work for classroom use; 47 however, it finds expression in the
statute as a result of extensive teacher lobbying, and a concern that
the full exploitation of modern audio-visual teaching aids would not
be possible without some copying. ' 8 Finally, a third source of
preferred uses will continue to be the body of case law which has
built up around the fair use concept. Such precedents serve to
amplify the meaning of the preferred purposes listed in the
proposed legislation. 49
F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914). The absence of direct authority is apparently just an indication of
the wide acceptance of such uses. See Jensen, note 120 supra.
"I It is difficult to discern the necessity of a distinction between criticism and comment for
the purpose of fair use. It would seem that these two terms are basically repetitious.
"' News reporting would certainly be fair under the Rosemont free-dissemination rationale,
see notes 137-38 supra, but no American case seems to have decided the question. See
Latman, Fair Use of Copyrighted Works, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG.,
2D SESS.. STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT LAw REvisION No. 15, p. 12 (Comm. print, 1960).
In England; the purposes listed in the 1911 Copyright Act were exclusive not illustrative,
so that a newsreel which included a copyrighted song which was being played as part of the
event being reported was held not to be a "'news summary" within the meaning of that
statute and therefore infringed the copyright of the song. Hawkes & Son (London), Ltd. v.
Paramount Film Service, Ltd. (1934) Ch. 593. This case was reversed by statute. Copyright
Act of 1956, § 6(3)(b), 4 & 5 Eliz. 11, c. 74.
"' Works of history, biography, and science would apparently be included here. See, e.g.,
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Holdredge v. Knight Publishing Corp., 214 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.
Cal. 1963); Greenbie v. Noble, 151 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Loew's Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc.. 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955), afj'd sub nom., Benny v.
Loew's, Inc., 239 l-.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affd by equally divided court, 356 U.S. 43
(1958); cj. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
I Although there is certain to be an overlap between scholarship and research, one group
of works included indices, directories and digests and apparently would fit more readily
under the research classification. See, e.g., Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n, 144 F. 83 (7th
Cir. 1906) affd, 209 U.S. 20 (1908); Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co.,
122 F. 922 (2d Cir. 1903); Produce Reporter Co. v. Fruit Produce Rating Agency, I F.2d 58
(N.D. Ill. 1924); Hartford Printing Co. v. Hartford Directory & Publishing Co., 146 F. 332
(D. Conn. 1906). See also notes 153-63 infra.
The term "research" might also be stretched to include the notes taken or other
reproductions made by a researcher in the course of his research. See Hearings Before
Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8, pt.
I, at 448-72 (1966) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings. 89th Cong.]; A. WEIL, AMERICAN
COPYRIGHT LAW 406 (1917).
' Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962).
'4" See House Hearings, 89th Cong., at 1770-87.
" See notes 142-46 supra.
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Additional Factors
In addition to the demand and nature of use tests, which can be
traced to the policies of the constitutional grant, other factors have
been considered relevant to a determination of fair use."' One of
these indicators, called the labor-saving factor, has rather wide
support in the cases,"5 ' but would appear to be only an application
of the two primary factors in a particular factual context. The
other component, the amount and substantiality of the use, is
included in the list of factors in the proposed codification of fair
use,' but has less frequently been independently considered by the
courts.
The labor-saving factor is most frequently resorted to in cases
involving directories,'53 indices,' 4 digests, 5 ' and certain other
works, 5 6 the production of which require primarily the expending
of labor to collect publicly available factual information. In spite
of some doubts as to whether such writings had enough
content-aside from facts in the public domain-to justify issuance
of a copyright, all the decisions have recognized the copyright in
such works." 7 These cases, typically against rival compilers,
predictably provoke a defense that the prior work was merely used
as a check on accuracy. Although the public's interest in accuracy
would seem to justify such use of copyrighted information,' 6
a holding on that ground would create the danger that a subsequent
compiler could price the first compiler out of the market by saving
labor through use of the prior compilations. Thus, the presence of
the labor-saving factor would militate against the finding of fair
"'See authorities cited note 87 supra.
"'See. e.g., authorities cited in notes 153-56 infra.
2 See note 192 infra.
" Hartford Printing Co. v. Hartford Directory & Publishing Co.. 146 F. 332 (C.C.D. Conn.
1906).
"' Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n, 144 F. 83 (7th Cir. 1906), affd, 209 U.S. 20 (1908);
Produce Reporter Co. v. Fruit Produce Rating Agency, I F.2d 58 (N.D. Ill. 1924).
" W.H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Publishing Co., 27 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1928):
Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co., 122 F. 922 (2d Cir. 1903).
"'See Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950). See notes 162-63
infra and accompanying text.
" E.g., Hartford Printing Co. v. Hartford Directory & Publishing Co., 146 F. 332, 333
(C.C.D. Conn. 1906).
SSee W.H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Publishing Co., 27 F.2d 82, 89 (6th Cir.
1928); Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co., 122 F. 922, 923 (2d Cir. 1903).
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use.5 9 In reconciling the policy favoring saving labor-which is an
underlying objective of the fair use doctrine-with the protection of
the copyright owner from being priced out of the market, the
courts have permitted a subsequent compiler to check his work
against the prior copyrighted work, but have forced him to confirm
any discrepancies by a check of original sources. 61 While this
solution seems reasonable in the context of copying indices, digests
and directories, where it arose, it appears to be merely a logical
application of the demand test to a rather unique circumstance.1 6'
It, therefore, should not constitute an independent variable in the
determination of fair use.
Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co.' 6 illustrates the consequences
that result from treating the "labor saving" rule as an independent
factor of general application outside of the limited context for
which it was developed. In Toksvig the defendant-author of a
biography of Hans Christian Anderson relied heavily on a prior,
copyrighted biography, the material for which had' been in large
part translated from the original Danish. Noting that such use had
enabled the defendant to produce her work in one year while the
previous work had required three, the court held that the use was
unfair because of the labor saved by the defendant. While the use in
Toksvig might have been unfair under a nature of use-diminution
of demand analysis, a mere saving in labor alone should not have
resulted in a finding of infringement, since a primary function of
the fair use doctrine is to prevent duplication of effort and to allow
subsequent authors to build on prior scholarship.'
"I Hartford Printing Co. v. Hartford Directory & Publishing Co., 146 F. 332, 334 (C.C.D.
Conn. 1906).
164 Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n, 144 F. 83, 84 (7th Cir. 1906), affd, 209 U.S. 20
(1908); Sampson & Muidock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539, 541 (Ist Cir. 1905);
Hartford Printing Co. v. Hartford Directory & Publishing Co., 146 F. 332, 334 (C.C.D.
Conn. 1906). Since accurate compilation would produce substantially identical works and
identical mistakes are unlikely, common errors have been given substantial weight in the
determination of noncompliance with this rule.
16 Thus, a use is being made of the copyrighted work that would reduce its demand by
enabling the subsequent user to sell at a lower price. See notes 98-104 supra and
accompanying text.
" 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950).
In disapproving of Toksvig, see note 156 supra and accompanying text, the Second
Circuit has stated: "We . . . cannot subscribe to the view that an author is absolutely
precluded from saving time and effort by ieferring to and relying upon prior published
material. . . . It is just such wasted effort that the proscription against the copyright of
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Another additional factor of fair use is the "amount" of the
portion copied in relationship to the work as a whole. Although
courts have never attempted to measure fair use quantitatively, they
have ruled that copying an entire work can never be fair use.'
Generally, it is true that a reproduction of a separately copyrighted
item such as an entire song65 or magazine cover 6 6 would so
adversely affect demand so as not to be justified by the nature of
any use. However, the unqualified formulation of the "entire work"
rule is misleading. For instance, copying an entire work for the
performance of a different function may have no adverse effect on
demand, 67 as was true where the use of a copyrighted hand puppet
on a children's television show was held not to be an
infringement.' 6 Furthermore, the "entire work" rule produces even
greater difficulty when it is applied in conjunction with section 3 of
the present Copyright Act, which provides that the copyright "shall
protect all of the copyrightable component parts of the work
copyrighted .... 116 By such coordinated application, reproduc-
tions of an illustration from a commercial catalogue and a newspa-
per have been held to fall within the "entire work" rule, 7" with the
resultant negation of fair use. The undesirable rigidity produced by
forbidding the reproduction of the "entire work" of a copyrightable
component part demands that the "entire work" rule be limited in
order to prevent elimination of the concept of fair use in the
context of verbatim appropriation. Otherwise, the inquiry becomes
ideas and facts, and to a less extent the privilege of fair use, are designed to prevent,"
Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc.. 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966), ,err.
denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967). See also W.H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Publishing Co.,
27 F.2d-82, 89 (6th Cir. 1928); Sampson & Murdock Co. v. Seaver-Radford Co., 140 F. 539,
541 (Ist Cir. 1905); Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1, 45 COLUM. L. RLV.
503, 511 (1945).
'"See, e.g.. Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962): Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.,
91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937); Conde Nast Publications, Inc. v. Vogue School of Fashion
Modelling, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
"I Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962).
'"Conde Nast Publications, Inc. v. Vogue School of Fashion Modelling, Inc., 105 I-.
Supp. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
"' For a discussion of the difference in -'function" and media see M. NIMMI.R.
COPYRIGHT § 145, at 646-68 (1963).
"'Mura v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
17 U.S.C. § 3 (1964).
", Markham v. A.E. Borden Co., 206 F.2d 199 (Ist Cir. 1953) (catalogue): Hedeman
Products Corp. v. Tap-Rite Prods. Corp., 228 F. Supp. 630 (D.N.J. 1964) (catalogue): Inter-
city Press, Inc. v. Siegfried, 172 F. Supp. 37 (W.D. Mo. 1958) (newspaper).
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merely whether the particular segment copied would be
independently copyrightable. Such a development would
unfortunately focus entirely on the nature of the appropriated
work, ignoring the constitutionally-based nature-of-use factor, and
its concern with the nature of the appropriating work."' Limitation
of the entire-work rule remains unresolved, the confusion being so
great that the committee considering revision of the copyright laws
was unable to reach any resolution in its report.7 2
In addition to "amount," "substantiality" is also listed as an
element in the proposed bill's fair use section.' These two elements
are listed conjunctively as "amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole."
Although "substantiality" might be interpreted to mean "amount"
considered in relation to the whole, its inclusion seems redundant
unless used as a term of art embodying the definitional nuances of
"substantial similarity." If substantiality is so used, it primarily
serves to indicate that there is a confused interrelationship between
substantial similarity and fair use. Although some commentators
have included among the indicators of fair use, elements that might
be summarized as substantiality, "4 the concept seems not to have
been separately considered as a factor in a finding of fair use. It
thus appears that the separate listing of substantiality is of
relatively little significance.
"' Chafee has convincingly demonstrated that a use does not have to be of a copyrightable
part in order to be an infringement. For instance, a "transitory expression" such as television
image would have been uncopyrightable according to Chafee because of its lack of permance
but unauthorized use of such an expression would be an infringement. Chafee, note 163
supra, at 504-05. It would also seem that the reverse is true, so that the reproduction of an
integral part of a larger work which might have been separately copyrighted does not
necessarily have to be an infringement. Thus, a beautifully formed descriptive paragraph
from a novel most certainly might have been separately copyrighted by an author if he had
produced it apart from any larger work and wished to publish it, but it does not follow that
a critic quoting a similar paragraph from the larger work would infringe upon such a work.
See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
72 H.R. REP. No. 83 at 34. The third factor which must be considered under the fair-use
section of the Copyright Bill indicates that the entire-work rule will continue to have some
vitality as a component part but not as an exclusive test for fair use. The third factor is
"... the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole." Presumably, under this language, the third element would weigh against a
finding of fair use unless the amount copied was less than the whole.
"'See note 192 infra.
' A frequent listing of factors to be considered is: "(1) the quantity and importance of the
material appropriated; (2) the value of this material to each of the works in controversy; (3)
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The Relationship Between Substantial Sintilarit' and Fair Use
One of the most perplexing dilemmas in the resolution of
infringement suits has long been whether or not substantial
similarity and fair use were synonomous concepts; whether both
doctrines would ever be utilized in the same kind of suit; and if
both concepts could be offered, what their relationship would be.
The controversy was clearly presented in Benny v. Loews, Inc.,"'
where Jack Benny used almost the verbatim script of the movie
Gaslight in a television parody, Autolight. In that case, the Ninth
Circuit stirred great controversy with the following statement:
The so-called doctrine of fair use of copyrighted material appears
in cases in federal courts having to do with compilations, listings,
digests, and the like . . . In certain of these cases, it is held that a
writer may be guided by earlier copyrighted works, may consult
original authorities, and may use those which he considers
applicable in support of his own original text . . . . In these
instances, as has been said, there are certain to be considerable
resemblances .... But up to the time of the present controversy,
no federal court, in any adjudication has supposed that there was a
doctrine of fair use applicable to copyrighting the substance of a
dramatic work, and presenting it, with few variations, as a
burlesque.'76
This statement from Benny dramatically highlights the separate
chains of authority which have developed. On one hand, substantial
similarity had been applied to works of the imagination such as
plays, novels, and songs, where the issue is generally the level of
abstraction at which copying is permissible." On the other hand,
fair use had been most frequently employed in suits involving works
that were certain to have a great deal of similarity, such as works
of science, directories, and indices, where the issue was generally
the extent to which the copied matter will tend to supercede the original, or interfere with its
sale." Comment, A Copyright Quandary: Parody. Burlesque and the Fair Use Doctrine, 29
ALBANY L. Rav. 312, 315 (1965); see Markham v. A.E. Borden Co., 206 F.2d 199 (Ist Cir.
1953); Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943).
Yankwich, What is Fair Use? 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 203, 213 (1954).
"1239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affd sub nona., Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
"I Id. at 536.
'"See M. NIMMER, note 167 supra, § 143.11. See also note 35 supra and accompanying




one of excessive verbatim copying. "' The use of material by parody
focused attention on this difference in treatment because it arguably
could fall into either category. While not requiring verbatim
quoting, parody is of necessity similar to the parodied work, but is
susceptible to more imaginative treatment than the typical work to
which the fair use doctrine had been applied.'79 By impliedly
repudiating the fair use doctrine and its chief component, the
nature-of-the-use test, in parody cases,' the Benny decision seemed
to preclude consideration of the nature of the use wherever
nonverbatim appropriation occurs. Furthermore, because the courts
have seldom consciously adverted to any distinction between
verbatim and nonverbatim appropriation, some commentators
understandably assumed that decisions like Benn were rejecting
the nature of use test as to both types of appropriation.IN'
Nevertheless subsequent cases-especially in the. Second
Circuit-seem to have employed the nature of use test in the
context of both nonverbatim and verbatim appropriation.' s2
The application of the nature-of-use test to nonverbatim
appropriation reveals an additional problem, however. Since
substantial similarity is tested against a demand standard or
alternatives crudely reflecting the demand factor,'83 application of
the doctrine of fair use after a determination of substantial
similarity will result in a duplication of the demand element, a
circumstance which probably explains much of the confusion as to
the appropriation. On the other hand, no concept corresponding to
" M. NI. NMER, note 167 supra, § 143.12. See also note 36 supra, where the excessive
verbatim question was classed as the third infringement issue.
"I Selvin, Parody and Burlesque oJ Copyrighted Works as Infringement, 6 BULL.
COPYRIGHT SoC'Y 53, 59-60 (1958).
""The idea that substantial similarity and fair use are coterminous has actually been
stated in several decisions. Compare Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Stonesifer, 140
F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1944), and Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d
Cir. 1936), with Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
"' See Jensen, Fair Use: As Viewed bY the User, 39 DICTA 25, 37 (1962); Selvin. supra
note 179, at 60; Note, Parody and Burlesque-lair Use or Copyright Injringenent. 12
'V AND. L. REV. 459, 478-79 (1959).
"'See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967) (popular biography); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329
F.2d 541 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964) (parody); notes 111-23 supra and
accompanying text.
See notes 53-77 supra and accompanying text.
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substantial similarity has been employed where the appropriation
was verbatim. Rather, fair use has in such a context encompassed
both the demand and nature of use tests.'84 Thus, both the concept
of substantial similarity and that of fair use have subsumed
demand and demand-related tests, the concept employed varying
with the type of appropriation in question.
To prevent the overlap of the demand factor in fair use and
substantial similarity on the plaintiff and the burden to establish
fair use doctrine to a determination of the nature of use and define
the concept of substantial similarity to include only the demand
factor.'85 So delineated, both fair use and substantial similarity
should be applied in cases involving either verbatim or nonverbatim
appropriation. Such a redefinition would also eliminate much of
the confusion that has surrounded the proper allocation of the
burden of proving fair use. Under the recommended definition, this
confusion is easily obviated by placing the burden of proving
substantial similarity on the plaintiff and the burden of establish
fair use on the defendant. Such a division of burden between the
plaintiff and defendant would be efficient because the evidence
needed to meet the demand test-which requires proof of present or
potential economic detriment' 86-would seem closely related to that
needed by any plaintiff to prove damages, and because the
defendant will be in a better position to demonstrate the necessity
of some appropriation for the production of his. work. Moreover,
allocating to the defendant the burden of proving fair use as an
excuse for the alleged economic diminution8 " seems in keeping with
the policy of making any defendant prove why he should not pay
for damage caused. 88 However, the greatest advantage of
'"See M. NiMMER, note 167 supra, §§ 143.12 and 145.
'ts nd.
'"See notes 97-104 supra and accompanying text.
'See notes 127-30 supra and accompanying text.
" In the current state of confusion about fair use, it has been stated that this burden is of
no practical importance. See Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright in COPYRIGHT AND
RELATED TOPICS 105 (Los Angeles Copyright Soc'y & U.C.L.A. Law School ed. 1964). This
position is not unfounded. It would seem that the primary function of classification as a defense
is to allocate the burden of pleading, proof and persuasion. The burden of pleading is of little
significance, however, since courts under the federal rules of civil procedure are reluctant to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, see Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944),
and decisions on the pleadings in copyright cases have been expressly discouraged,
MacDonald v. Du Maurier, 144 F.2d 696, 700-01 (2d Cir. 1944); Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn,
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subsuming the demand test under substantial similarity and the
nature of use test under fair use is that the primary factors
constituting infringement would be clearly delineated along lines
approximating those of the two policies expressed in the copyright
clause of the Constitution. The respective tests retain the same
basic relationship as the policies from which they are derived"8 9 but
are disentangled so that this relationship is more readily apparent
and more easily applied.
The Effect of Codification
After extensive hearings and floor debate during the Eighty-
Ninth Congress,'9 the House passed a bill representing a thorough
revision of the copyright law.' Section 107 of that bill provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies of phono-
records or by any other means specified by that section for pur-
poses such as criticisms, comment, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case
is a fair use, the factors to be considered shall include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantially [sic] of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work. 9-
Although the committee report insisted that Section 107 is intended
Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). The burden of going forward is not of its usual
importance since fair use is frequently decided on the basis of a comparison of the two
works, see Tralins v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 160 F. Supp. 511 (D. Md. 1958);
Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1918), and not surprisingly the plaintiff must
append a copy of each to his petition. Rule 2, Rules Adopted by the Supreme Court of-the
United States for Practice and Procedure under Copyright Act. Furthermore, since most
copyright decisions are heard by the judge, see notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text, the
burden of persuasion would seem to be much less important than when the trier of fact is a
jury. It is unlikely that a judge will find all other factors so equally balanced that he will be
swayed by this burden alone.
"' See notes 127-30 supra and accompanying text.
" See House Hearings. 89th Cong.; 113 CONG. REc. 3626 (daily ed. April 6, 1967); 113
CONG. REC. 3857 (daily ed. April 11, 1967).
"'See H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967).
" Copyright Bill § 107.
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to codify and- not to change the current scope of fair use, '" one
conclusion is evident: What Congress thinks the law is in this ill-
defined area is certain to influence the future judicial development
of the fair use doctrine.
The most salient feature of this statutory definition is its express
recognition of the validity of the nature of the use test. 9  Thus
enactment would resolve any lingering doubt that was raised by the
Benny holding.'95 Furthermore, the bill's enumeration of purposes
for which fair use may be made is a potential source of preferred
uses which could simplify the courts' inquiry in this regard. "6 The
present proposal is not free of deficiencies, however. For example,
the bill states that both demand and nature of the use "shall" be
considered in determining fair use. This combination if enacted
could deter the simplification and delineation of substantial
similarity and fair use.'97 To prevent such a restriction on the
evolution of the fair use concept, it might be preferable to delete the
entire final sentence of the section. 9 This would leave the
congressional recognition of fair use intact and still give
preferential recognition to teaching uses and uses by other interests
with strong lobbies, which was the primary motivation for
expansion'99 of the original proposed section which made no
attempt at definition."' Such a deletion could be justified on the
193 H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1967). But see Hearings on S. 597 Belore
the Subconm. on Patents, Trademarks. and Copyrights of the Conint. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., Ist Sess., pt. I, at 221 (1967).
19, Section 107 speaks in terms of "purpose" and "nature," but apparently these terms are
synonomous with "nature." See note 140 supra.
"' See notes 115-23 supra and accompanying text.
' See notes 140-49 supra and accompanying text. But see Schulman, Fair Use and the
Revision of the Copyright Law, 52 IowA L. REV. 832 (1968).
"' See notes 175-89 supra and accompanying text.
"' The section would then read:'"[N]ot withstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair
use of a copyright work, including such use by reproduction in copies of phonorecords or b)
any other means specified by that section for purposes such as criticisms, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." This
abbreviated version would meet the general requirements of the original recommendations of
the Copyright Office which stated: "The statute should include a provision affirming and
indicating the scope of the principle that fair use does not infringe the copyright owner's
rights." HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw 25
(Comm. Print 1961).
"'See H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. (1967).
0"The Copyright Bill § 107 as it stood at the beginning of the House Hearings read:
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broad ground that even a listing of inclusions structures the concept
beyond its present judicial formulation and may inhibit further
development. However, the drawback to this suggestion is that the
bill's express recognition of the nature of the use test would be
eliminated.
A more modest proposal consistent with the recommendations
here offered would be to delete only clauses three and four of the
bill, which incorporate the demand factor into fair use
considerations. Perhaps these demand-factor criteria could be
delineated in a separate section defining substantial similarity. Such
a modification would enable the courts to avert the substantial
similarity-fair use overlap, and to allocate the burden of proof
equitably and in a manner which would promote the, fullest
agreement on all relevant points.
"Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work is not an
infringement of copyright." House hearings, 89th Cong. at 5.
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